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Abstract 
I provide an analysis of the concept of an “affordance” that enables one to conceive of 
“structural affordance” as a kind of affordance relation that might hold between an 
agent and its body. I then review research in the science of humanoid bodily move-
ment to indicate the empirical reality of structural affordance. 
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One of Gibson’s novel contributions to perceptual psychology is the notion of an affor-
dance. In this article, I provide an analysis of the concept that allows one to think 
about a kind of affordance relation that might hold between an agent and its body, 
which I call “structural affordance”. After a brief specification of the latter, I review 
research in the science of humanoid bodily movement to provide some indication of 
the empirical reality of structural affordances. 
 
Gibson’s affordances 
Here is the first example of an affordance that Gibson provides: 
If a terrestrial surface is nearly horizontal (instead of slanted), nearly flat (instead 
of convex or concave), and sufficiently extended (relative to the size of the animal) 
and if its substance is rigid (relative to the weight of the animal), then the surface 
affords support. (Gibson 1979/1986: 127, emphasis original)  
The status of affordances is slightly ambiguous. At first blush, when Gibson says that 
the surface affords support, it would suggest that he wishes to pick out certain proper-
ties of the environment. Indeed, when he introduces the term itself he says that the 
“affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal” (ibid.: 127, emphasis 
mine). But then he says this: “The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the 
noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both 
the animal and the environment in a way that no existing term does” (ibid., emphasis 
mine). How could a term refer to both animal and environment? He then offers a third AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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option (which I think is the most sensible), saying what he wants to refer to is some-
thing that implicates their relationship, for he insists that the term “implies the com-
plementarity of the animal and the environment” (ibid., emphasis mine). So we have a 
few options for interpreting the term. Indeed, there are two extremes. At one end, the 
interpretation is that “affordance” denotes a property of the environment which bears 
a special and particular relationship to an animal.
29 At the other end, “affordance” 
denotes the (special, particular) relation itself.
30 Although this is a significant matter of 
theoretical choice, I opt for the latter interpretation; but not entirely without motiva-
tion. Treating affordances as relations is the simplest way of capturing the reality of 
affordances: they are as real as their relata.
31 
Interpretive issues aside, there are several things about affordances that are clear. The 
relations are certainly conditional. They only occur within a certain range of possibili-
ty, denoted here by the explicit contrasts used (nearly horizontal vs. slanted etc.). In 
this case, and presumably others, multiple conditions must simultaneously obtain in a 
particular situation for the instantiation of a particular affordance. If a terrestrial sur-
face were nearly horizontal over one period of time, but only sufficiently extended at 
another, and rigid at neither time, then there would be no time during which the af-
fordance held at that place. And the same point holds, of course, for conditions holding 
in different places at the same time. It is also clear that the conditions are not neces-
sarily binary phenomena, but are potentially graded; a surface that is nearly flat may 
do just as well as a surface that is completely flat. This gradation may further dictate 
the extent to which an affordance holds (and even in part its evaluation as positive or 
negative). A slippery surface, for instance, might be some grade between an affor-
dance of support and falling; and this might be an instability to be exploited by the 
right morphology (cf. Pfeifer and Bongard 2007: 99). 
                                                             
29 In what follows, I use the notion of a property in the general sense that objects (e.g., pears, chairs) are 
characterised by their properties (e.g., sweetness, rigidity). I treat them as distinct from relations for the 
sake of clarity; relational properties are distinct from the relations they instantiate. Most of what I say could 
be altered to treat relations as properties predicated of more than one individual, but with needless compli-
cation. Conversely, one might do away with properties altogether and define the notion of a structural af-
fordance (discussed below) solely in terms of relations (see footnote 5). I will not explore the consequences 
of this here. 
30  There  is  of  course  the  possibility  that  affordances  could  be  both.  Norman  (1988)  aims  to  provide  a 
distinction between perceived and real affordances. In effect, this is a distinction between the perceived 
properties of a thing (viz. properties that bear particular relations to particular animals) and the actual 
relation  that  an  animal  bears  to  that  thing.  It  should  be  noted  that  much  theoretical  literature  on 
affordances  assumes  that  affordances  are  environmental  properties  that  bear  particular  relations  to 
animals, and occasionally this assumption is made without argument (see Chemero 2009: 135 - 47 for a 
review).  However,  others  have  argued  for  the  view  that  affordances  are  properties  of  an  animal-
environment system (Stoffregen 2003), or relations between the abilities of animals and features of their 
environments (Chemero 2003). As the reader can surmise, my preference is for the latter.  
31 I sideline the further possibility that affordances might be dispositional states (or indeed, properties) of 
the  agent’s  nervous  system  (Ellis  and  Tucker  2000).  I  do  so  firstly  because  it  is  so  far  from  Gibson’s 
intentions; secondly, because I suspect that the truth of the proposal depends upon the explanatory scope of 
the notion of representation; and thirdly, because even if it were the case that affordances (in general, not 
merely Ellis and Tucker’s micro-affordances) were representational, the question of what they represent 
(properties of the environment or relations between animal and environment) would still be at issue, i.e., 
the central issue would remain unsettled. A Remedy called Affordance 
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Identifying affordances requires identifying relational properties of the environment 
that are inter-dependent with relational properties of the animal. And they must be 
identified as such; for only this would give us a handle on the complementary rela-
tionship that is putatively at hand in the instantiation of an affordance.
32 But it certain-
ly does not follow from the fact that a theory of affordances must identify certain rela-
tional properties, that they must be known to the perceiver under that description. In 
fact this is just what Gibson wished to avoid. If there is anything that is clear about 
what it means to perceive an affordance, it is that it is precisely not supposed to con-
vey the idea that seeing a surface as affording support involves entertaining (or en-
dorsing) a thought such as: 
  The surface I see that is nearly horizontal (instead of slanted), nearly flat (in-
stead of convex or concave), and sufficiently extended (relative to the size of 
my body) and its substance is rigid (relative to my body) is in such-and-such a 
spatiotemporal relation to me that the relation affords support. 
If anything is meant to follow from Gibson’s claim that “affordances seem to be per-
ceived directly because they are perceived directly”, it is that the perceiver need not be 
appraised of affordance relations under any description of them as such in order to 
perceive them. (1979/1986: 140) 
Nevertheless, in order to study affordances one needs to identify the relational proper-
ties of the animal that are supposed to stand in an affordance relation with the envi-
ronment. In the quoted case, size and weight (at least) seem to be important proper-
ties. These may be determined in a number of ways, for instance, relative to conven-
tions of measurement designed to approximate objective physical units, or relative to 
a particular contextual relation with no such design. The crucial difference here is that 
the contextual relation is symmetric, whereas the conventional relation is asymmetric. 
The girl being six feet tall depends upon conventional measurements of feet and inch-
es, but conventional measurements of feet and inches do not depend upon the height 
of any particular individual. There have been some elegant studies designed to dem-
onstrate the importance of contextual (rather than conventional) relations in the in-
stantiation of an affordance. For instance, Warren and Whang (1987) sought to inves-
tigate the extent to which an aperture affords walking from one side of a partition to 
the other by measuring the frequency of shoulder turning in a group of smaller-than-
average participants and a group of larger-than-average participants. Unsurprisingly, 
a decreased frequency of shoulder turning was found to be positively correlated with 
an increase in aperture width. But when aperture width was determined relative to 
conventional physical units, the psychophysical functions of the two groups were fair-
ly dissimilar. It was only when aperture width was determined relative to the distance 
between  the  participant’s  shoulders  that  the  psychophysical  functions  of  the  two 
groups became comparable (indeed, strikingly similar). 
 
                                                             
32 By this I mean that in order for a theorist to recognise that an affordance is instantiated, it needs to be 
identified in some way. This somewhat mundane point is certainly distinct from the claim that affordances 
need to be identified (and recognised) in order to be instantiated.  AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Structural affordances 
I now want to argue that there is a particular kind of affordance relation pertaining to 
the structure of the body, one that can be distinguished from all others. The initial 
impetus comes from Jose Luis Bermúdez’s discussion of a candidate solution to the 
problem of how to segment the body into parts: 
Let me now introduce the technical concept of a hinge. The intuitive idea that I 
want to capture with this term is the idea of a body part that allows one to move a 
further body part. Examples of hinges are the neck, the jaw socket, the shoulders, 
the elbows, the wrists, the knuckles, the ﬁnger joints, the leg sockets, the knees, and 
the ankles. The distinction between moveable and immoveable body parts, together 
with the concept of a hinge, creates the following picture of how the human body is 
segmented.  A  relatively  immoveable  torso  is  linked  by  hinges  to  five  moveable 
limbs (the head, two legs, and two arms), each of which is further segmented by 
means of further hinges. (1998: 155) 
Bermúdez suggests that his talk of hinges “provides a nonarbitrary way of segmenting 
the  body  that  accords  pretty  closely  with  how  we  classify  body  parts  in  everyday 
thought and speech” (1998: 156). This is not quite right. It may be non-arbitrary, but it 
does not exactly capture reference to noses and ears, for example. Still, I want to ex-
tract something positive from the idea by noting another point he makes, which is that 
“awareness of the location of the hinges, as well as of the possibilities for movement 
that they afford, can plausibly be viewed as an inevitable concomitant of learning to 
act with one’s body” (ibid.: 156). A look around his book would suggest that Bermúdez 
is using the notion of an affordance here in the Gibsonian sense (cf. Bermúdez 1998: 
103 - 29). According to the account of affordances adopted above, affordances are rela-
tions. Here the relationship is between a bodily agent and its body. Call this kind of an 
affordance a structural affordance (SA), to repeat: 
SA  A structural affordance is a relation between a bodily agent and its body. 
This in turn enriches the idea of an (ordinary) affordance relation between an agent 
and environment. On this analysis, agent-environmental affordances (leapability, 
malleability etc.) are second-order relations, prior to which are an agent’s first-order 
SAs. Call agent-environmental affordances AEs for the sake of the distinction. One can 
define the relationship between SAs and AEs as follows; reading Q and R as specific 
relations, x as an unspecified relation, and b as an individual: 
(1).  If there are affordances, then there are SAs. 
(2).  There are affordances that are not SAs.  
(3).  If x is an affordance in which b is a relatum, then either x is an SA relation R, or 
else x is an AE relation Q, and b is a relatum in Q in virtue of being a relatum in 
R. 
The definition of the relationship between SAs and environmental affordances is simi-
lar to a seminal definition of the notion of a basic action (cf. Danto 1965: 142). Here I 
will understand basic action to mean any instance of an agent trying to maintain or A Remedy called Affordance 
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change its bodily comportment. This is nevertheless meant to be along the lines of the 
typical understanding. A basic action can be in the service of some further (instrumen-
tal) action that an agent is trying to perform, but it need not be. Furthermore, trying to 
act requires the following condition: only when actions are initiated (and usually per-
formed) under the impression that the actual performance is possible might we say 
that the agent tries or is trying to perform that action. This is one side of the philosoph-
ical coin paid in a trying-analysis of action, the other side of which is the metaphysical 
possibility of the action’s total failure. O’Shaughnessy provides a description of this 
latter:  
There  is  a  perfectly  genuine  sense,  suppressed  by  philosophers  of  a  common-
sensical orientation, in which no event, including intended act-events, can be fore-
told as an absolute certainty. That sense is this: the world is known to have har-
bored freak happenings; this is a permanent potential of the world, and of no 
situation can it be said: “This situation bears a charmed life, it is guaranteed not 
to harbor such a freak”. (1973: 365 - 66) 
Here besides the suggestion of the metaphysical possibility of a radically indetermi-
nate world there is the significant insight that when we try to perform some basic ac-
tion such trying is always engaged in spite of the possibility that reality may not co-
operate. Nevertheless, “trying entails the presumption on the agent’s part that success 
is at least a remote possibility” (O'Shaughnessy 1973: 367). If this is correct then there 
ought to be some way of specifying the constraints on the action in question. One way 
of doing so would be to appeal to the fact that the body itself has structure. A positive 
feature of Bermudez’s hinge analysis is that it forefronts the fact that parts of the body 
have the relational property of being interlocked with one another. Furthermore, by 
employing “the idea of a body part that allows one to move a further body part” in the 
analysis, Bermudez likely intends to indicate the importance of this property in this 
regard. The assumption being that it is in virtue of the fact that its body parts are inter-
locked with one another that a bodily agent is able to act. But this cannot be sufficient 
for the possibility of basic action. It is not so much the interlocking of parts that is im-
portant, but rather (as a consequence) the manner in which the parts causally interact, 
in virtue of their properties. Moreover, in absence of reasons to think otherwise, one 
ought to allow for the possibility of part-whole causal interaction, in addition to the 
possibility of part-part interaction forefronted by Bermudez’s hinge analysis. 
Here then is a fuller definition, unpacking the notion of a structural affordance fur-
ther: 
SA*  A structural affordance is a relation between a bodily agent b and the proper-
ties I
P and I
W of parts of its body, in virtue of which a basic action φ is possible 
for b. 
o  I
P is the property of being causally interactive with other parts x1, x2, x3, 
... ,xn in virtue of their properties P1, P2, P3, … Pn. 
o  I
W is the property of being causally interactive with the whole body in 
virtue of its properties W1, W2, W3, … Wn. AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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This is closer to being satisfactory.
33 Now the main work is in showing that reality of 
structural affordances is plausible. I will do this by means of a potted review of re-
search in motor coordination. The aim is to make some piecemeal progress by picking 
out at least a few candidate Ps and Ws (marking them as (P) and (W) as I go along). In 
doing so, I hope to highlight some of the causal processes on which SAs are dependent. 
I will also minimally address how something might count as a bodily agent, and thus 
how something can count as a basic action of a bodily agent (when I do that it will be 
obvious I am doing so). My treatment of these will be somewhat cursory, but sufficient 
to indicate the direction I think a treatment of SAs should take.
34 
 
The empirical reality of structural affordances 
A significant property of multi-jointed agents is motor redundancy (see Figure 1). 
Latash summarises a favourite example, which he attributes to the father of the con-
cept, Nikolai Bernstein: 
Touch your nose with your right index finger. Now try to move the arm without 
losing the contact between the fingertip and the nose. This is easy to do. This 
means that one can touch the nose with very many combinations of arm joint 
angles. Nevertheless, when the task was presented, you did it with a particular 
joint combination. (Latash 2008: 35)
35 
His point is that your arm has the (P) property of being highly redundant in a certain 
sense. A glance at Figure 1 can help clarify. Assume an idealisation of your arm as 
having only four joints (shoulder, elbow, wrist and first knuckle), where each joint has 
only one degree of freedom. In order to reach endpoint E, you could assume angles a, 
b, c and d. But you could also reach E by assuming a’, b’, c’ and d’. Indeed, you could 
also reach E by assuming a’’, b’’, c’’, d’’ etc.  
 
 
                                                             
33 An alternative (suggested to me by Sascha Fink) would be to describe structural affordances literally as 
structures with sets of relations defined upon them. This would be something like the following: 
SA**  A structural affordance is a relation between a bodily agent b and the relations I and J governing 
the set of b’s body parts, in virtue of which a basic action φ is possible for b 
o  I is the relation of part x causally interacting with other parts x1, x2, x3, ... , xn 
o  J is the relation of part x causally interacting with the whole body 
An interesting line of future research would be to explore the implications of this and other alternative ways 
of defining structural affordances. 
34 There is in fact a large literature on the study of agent-environmental affordances that I leave aside for the 
sake of brevity (See, e.g., Ellis and Tucker 2000; McBride, Sumner, and Husain 2011). Suffice to say, if the 
concept of a structural affordance picks out something real, it ought to figure in a full explanation of the 
phenomena revealed in these studies.  
35 Latash makes something of an understatement here. He is well aware that there are not just “very many 
combinations of arm joint angles” that will bring the finger to the nose. As he notes later, potentially the 
number of combinations is infinite (Latash 2008: 36). A Remedy called Affordance 
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Figure 1– Redundancy in a four joint limb 
 
See main text. 
Adapted from Latash (2008: 36). 
Redundancy thus described, gives rise to a very simplified instance of what is often 
known as Bernstein’s problem. As Michael Turvey notes, when considered as a (W) 
property of the whole body, motor redundancy is all the more complex: 
As characteristic expressions of biological systems, coordinations necessarily in-
volve bringing into proper relation multiple and different component parts (e.g. 
10
14 cellular units in 10
3 varieties), defined over multiple scales of space and time. 
The  challenge  of  properly relating many  different components  is  readily  illus-
trated [...] There are about 792 muscles in the human body that combine to bring 
about energetic changes at the skeletal joints. Suppose we conceptualize the hu-
man body as an aggregate of just hinge joints like the elbow. It would then com-
prise  about  100  mechanical  degrees  of  freedom  each  characterizable  by  two 
states, position and velocity, to yield a state space of, minimally, 200 dimensions. 
(1990: 938) 
Suffice to say that a 200-dimensional space of possibilities (which itself is a simplifica-
tion)  is  of  mind-boggling  complexity.  Biological  movements  regularly  trace  a  path 
through the high-dimensional spaces that Bernstein’s problem reveals. But, interes-
tingly, they regularly exploit the variety of options; they trace different paths to reach 
the same goal. And this is the case even in stereotyped movements performed by high-
ly trained individuals. As Latash conveys, Bernstein discovered this himself in a care-
ful study of labour workers (Latash 2008: 31). He attached small light-bulbs at key 
points on the bodies of blacksmiths, as well as on their familiar hammer. Then he pho-
tographed their movements using an innovative high-speed shutter, whilst they per-
formed  a typical hammer-strike.  What  the  photos  revealed  was that across  strikes 
there was much less variability in the movement of the tool than in the various indi-
vidual joints moving it. This suggests a simple and smart solution to Bernstein’s prob-
lem: treat the system as if it had fewer degrees of freedom by lumping components 
together. J. A. Scott Kelso illustrates the idea nicely: 
 AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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During a movement, the internal degrees of freedom are not controlled directly 
but are constrained to relate among themselves in a relatively fixed and autono-
mous  fashion.  Imagine  driving  a  car  or  a  truck  that  had  a  separate  steering 
mechanism  for  each  wheel instead  of  a  single  steering mechanism  for  all  the 
wheels. Tough, to say the least! Joining the components into a collective unit, 
however, allows the collective to be controlled as if it had fewer degrees of free-
dom than make up its parts, thus greatly simplifying control. (1995: 38) 
This  solution motivates a fairly  autonomous  conception  of  components  of a motor 
task, where “elements of a system are not controlled individually, like segments of a 
marionette’s  body  by  attached  strings,  but  united  into  task-specific  [...]  structural 
units”  (Latash  2008:  53,  emphasis  original).  According  to  this  gloss,  task-specific 
structural unity is a (P) property of the blacksmith’s arms. Parts of the blacksmith’s 
arm work in cooperation, stabilising and compensating for one another’s variable be-
haviour to consistently reach the target. 
Task-specific structural unity can also be seen as a (W) property of the whole body in 
an activity like locomotion. To give an intuitive illustration, consider how one might 
approach the design of systems capable of human-like walking. Humans, like all three-
dimensional objects, have a minimum of three degrees of freedom: a body can pitch 
forward and back, roll side-to-side, and turn (yaw) left or right. If a locomotive body is 
treated as a structural unit then it might be possible to keep the number of its degrees 
of freedom fairly close to three. Pitching and rolling are less technically known as 
leaning. Too much leaning can lead to falling over, so leaning whilst walking ought to 
somehow be stabilised. The problem can be conceived by imagining the walker as an 
inverted pendulum on either the sagittal or frontal plane. The aim is to keep the ball of 
the pendulum roughly perpendicular to a flat walking surface (idealized as having no 
incline or decline). What is required is to achieve a sustained natural pendular motion 
by instantiating the (W) property of stably coupled components. One way of doing this 
would be to make sure that pressure exerted upon the walking surface is kept within a 
safe area inside the foot edges, by making sure that the foot of the stance leg remains 
flat on the floor whilst the swing leg is brought forward (Wisse 2005: 113- 14).
36 But 
this is harder than it sounds. All potentially destabilising elements would require con-
tinuous  monitoring  and  control,  which  adds  considerably  to  the  basic  three-
dimensions. 
Enter the wild-walker. The Delft Biorobotics lab have developed a simple construction 
that they call Mike, to demonstrate that the task specified above can be more simply 
executed by coupling components to one another such that they collectively produce a 
self-stabilising behaviour. Mike has two symmetrical pairs of legs, each leg in a pair is 
fused to the other, one pair moves outside the other, and each pair has a knee joint 
(see Figure 2A). To facilitate movement on a flat (rather than a declining sloped) sur-
face, Mike has oscillatory pneumatic actuators, called McKibben muscles, either side 
                                                             
36 As the expression flat-footed connotes, this is not in fact how most humans ought to place their feet. As 
Wisse and van Frankenhuyzen (2006: 144) point out, the shape of typical human feet actually channels the 
centre of pressure forwards in the progression of the step cycle. This fact has been reflected and exploited in 
the design of prosthetic feet, and wild-walkers since McGeer’s early prototypes. A Remedy called Affordance 
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of his outer hip joints. There is also a muscle at every knee joint extending the leg, 
counteracted by a spring on the other side (see Figure 2B). Muscle activity is regulated 
by manually tuned timing and a simple switching mechanism in the inner and outer 
feet that antagonistically couples the hip muscles. So, for example, when the inner foot 
mechanism switches, the outer knee muscles are deactivated, the muscles at front of 
the outer hip are activated. The knee muscle is reactivated just under half a second 
later, and as the outer foot strikes, the mechanism switches the power from the front 
hip muscles to those at the back. As a result, when set to walking, Mike exhibits a ro-
bust gait, with a fairly fast leg motion of even length (see Wisse 2005: 116 - 22; Wisse 
and Frankenhuyzen 2006). In fact this is the key, as Mike’s intrinsic dynamics essen-
tially implement the following two principles: “You will never fall forward if you put 
your swing leg fast enough in front of your stance leg. In order to prevent falling 
backward the next step, the swing leg shouldn’t be too far in front” (Wisse 2005: 122, 
italics removed). 
Figure 2– Humanoid walker prototypes  
at the Delft Technical University Biorobotics lab 
 
(A) Mike, a quadruped two-dimensional walker with actuated hips and knees. 
(B) “McKibben muscles” situated on Mike’s hips and knees (see text). 
(C)  Denise,  a  biped  three-dimensional  walker  with  unactuated  knees,  a  passive  upper  body,  coun-
terswinging arms and an ankle joint modelled on a skate-board truck. 
(D) Video-stills of Denise in motion (video available at http://dbl.tudelft.nl). 
All pictures from Wisse (2005), reprinted with permission from the author. 
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Mike’s structure presents a solution to a tendency for unstable pitching that keeps 
degrees of freedom low. In fact, he is built to have only three degrees of freedom, one 
at his hip, and one for each pair of knees. As a result, Mike only moves in the sagittal 
and horizontal plane. From the side, he looks like someone marching. But from the 
front he looks like someone shuffling on crutches, for the lateral stability inherent in 
his inner-outer leg design foregoes the problem of lateral leaning. A slightly more 
humanoid solution to this would be lateral foot-placement; but a potential drawback is 
that reducing lateral leaning in this way could lead to an increase in pitching instabili-
ty. Martijn Wisse suggests a compromise: 
Similar  to  skateboards  and  bicycles,  one  could  use  steering  (yaw)  to  stabilize 
lean, at least as long as the system is moving forward with sufficient velocity. The 
same principle is applicable to walking, and can be implemented in walking ro-
bots with an ankle joint that kinematically couples lean to yaw. (2005: 125) 
Working on these principles the Delft team built Denise, a three-dimensional walker. 
Denise only has two feet, she also has a passive upper body, two counter-swinging 
arms rigidly coupled to hip angle, and a (skateboard-like) lateral leaning ankle joint, 
resulting in five degrees of freedom (see Figure 2C). Her ankles and knees are entirely 
passive, and her hip joint reciprocally couples her two legs to one another. Her hip 
motion is controlled in a similar manner to Mike’s, but with less actuation. At each 
step, a switch in the striking foot activates the contralateral hip muscle, and releases a 
latch at the knee joint, allowing the leg to bend and then swing back to extension. Be-
cause of the ankle joint, each of Denise’s steps is slightly laterally displaced. But each 
step drives her forward to another step: when the right foot strikes, the left knee is 
released, and the hip muscles start pulling the left leg forward, Denise’s weight shifts 
forwards, the leg extends and the foot lands, repeating the process for the contralater-
al leg. Consequently, she swaggers along stably at around 2.5 km/h (see Figure 2D). 
To the extent that Mike and Denise provide models of actual walking, they provide 
nice examples of whole body structural unities that could be constituent properties of 
an SA. But the presence or absence of an affordance for basic action can be rather la-
bile. An interesting case of this is found in the development of infant locomotion. Most 
newborn  infants  exhibit  alternate  stepping  movements  if  their  upper  body  is  sup-
ported, though these seem to “disappear” after a couple of months (Zelazo, Zelazo, and 
Kolb 1972). Beyond this, Esther Thelen and colleagues made several further observa-
tions. First is that these movements are “not random thrashings of the legs, but rather 
organized movements with a recognisable structure in time and space” (Thelen and 
Smith 1994: 11). Second is that these babies actually exhibit increased movement of 
their legs in the putative non-stepping period: they become rather fond of kicking their 
feet in the air as they lie on their back. These are rather striking when combined with 
a third: that these supine kicking movements exhibit the same kinematic profile (viz. 
structure in time and space) and a similar pattern of muscular activity to their preco-
cial stepping movements (Thelen and Fisher 1982). From these and other data points, 
Thelen and Smith conclude that “what had previously been considered as distinct and 
separate behaviors” are in fact “manifestations of the same motor output performed 
in two different postures” (op. cit.: 11). A Remedy called Affordance 
 
104
So what had changed? Why do these kids stop stepping when they can perform the 
movement involved perfectly well? A further line of Thelen’s research indicates that 
the affordance fades as they lose the (P) property of a delicately balanced force-to-
mass ratio. Newborns get fatter faster than their muscles can handle, they are simply 
not strong enough to keep their (perfectly healthy) chub in check. With this in mind 
Thelen, Fisher and Ridley-Johnson (1984) compared stepping frequency with the rate 
of change in newborn infants’ body mass over the first month of life. They found that 
“infants who had gained the most stepped less” than infants who were gaining weight 
more slowly, suggesting that it was the rate at which body mass increased rather than 
simply body mass itself that caused the stepping reflex to recede (ibid.: 485). To fur-
ther probe the ways in which muscle strength is an index of the bounds of movement, 
they investigated the extent to which stepping could be influenced by adding and re-
lieving weight. And, unsurprisingly, after being loaded with the equivalent of an extra 
two weeks’ worth of body mass, infant stepping decreased significantly in frequency 
and height, whilst submerging them in a bath of warm water (see Figure 3) produced 
the opposite effect (ibid.: 489). 
Figure 3– Stepping reflex in the human infant 
 
(A) 3-month old tested for stepping with feet on table; infrared light-emitting diodes are visible on the hip, 
knee, ankle and toe joints.  
(B) Stepping reflex induced in the same 3-month old when submerged in warm water. 
Both from Thelen& Smith (1994: 12). 
However, if this is to be attributed as an action, it needs to exhibit the requisite task-
specific flexibility. Some indication of this again comes from Thelen’s work. She dis-
covered that 7-month-old infants (i.e., infants who might otherwise be thought to be at 
a non-stepping age), if provided with upper body support, produced pronounced and 
smoothly coordinated stepping movements as soon as they were placed on a treadmill 
(Thelen 1986). Soon after (inspired by studies on quadruped gait) Thelen, Ulrich and 
Niles (1987) placed infants of the same age on a split-belt treadmill (see Figure 4A & B), 
and observed smooth adjustments of swing and stance when the belts were run at 
different speeds. This work has been followed up more recently in an elegant study by AVANT Volume III, Number 2/2012 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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Yang, Lamont and Pang (2005). From their sample of 5-12-month old infants they re-
port that the majority could not only rapidly adapt to belts running at 2:1 ratios, but 
could also produce coordinated stepping on belts running in opposite directions (see 
Figure 4E)! 
Figure 4– Treadmill stepping patterns in pre-walking infants 
 
(A) Infant being supported on a split-belt treadmill. 
(B) Split-belt treadmill filmed from four angles with infrared cameras (see curtain rails) and an ordinary 
video camera (positioned on the floor beside the treadmill). 
Both from Thelen& Ulrich (1991: 49). 
(C) Toe-strike stepping. 
(D) Flat-foot stepping. 
Both from Ulrich (1997: 326) 
(E) Bidirectional split-belt stepping: left leg steps forward,  whilst right leg steps backward. Solid arrows 
indicate belt-motion and foot-motion during stance. Open arrows indicate foot-motion during swing. 
From Yang, Lamont, & Pang(2005: 6874) 
 
Typical adult  stepping  involves  a  rolling foot motion  in  which  the heel  strikes  the 
ground first, moving through the flat of the foot to the toe. By contrast, neonatal step-
ping often involves toe-first strikes (see Figure 4C) and the occasional flat-footed con-
tact (see Figure 4D). To investigate the intermediate stages more closely, Thelen and 
Ulrich (1991: 36ff.) looked for individual differences that might predict the emergence 
of stable treadmill stepping in the first year of life. They discovered a trend of poor 
treadmill performance associated with toe-first striking and/or inward foot rotation, 
whereas good swing and stance came with flat-footed contact. Only in the latter post-
ure can the stance leg be pulled back far enough for a sufficient frequency of muscle 
spindle impulses to loop through the spine and activate the antagonists, so the leg can 
then swing far enough in front for a stable step. And, as Thelen and Smith explain, the A Remedy called Affordance 
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flat-footed  postural  arrangement  is  only  available  given  the  (P)  property  of  well-
balanced relative tension of antagonistic muscles.
37 In particular, the tension of flexors 
needs to be within a certain range: 
[If] the tension [in flexors] is too loose, the treadmill will not impart sufficient 
stretch to overcome the inertia of the leg and it will not swing forward [alterna-
tively, if the flexors are too tight] the treadmill will not impart enough pull to 
stretch it. In neither case will the stretch receptors be sufficiently activated for 
reciprocal phasing. (Thelen and Smith 1994: 112) 
With that I hope to have sufficiently illustrated the delicate balance of (P) and (W) 
properties in virtue of which basic actions are possible, and thereby given a rudimen-
tary sense of what structural affordances actually are. This is little more than a begin-
ning of the study of structural affordances, for although (as reviewed above) the rela-
tional properties which they typically involve are well understood, the relations them-
selves are rarely identified as such. 
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